So what was the problem? Sales down, margins down...and by the time you get to the EPS line a substantial decline. Pretty ugly.
Where's the main culprit? Well the physical stores comparable sales measure was ugly (no wonder the company 'finalized our plan to close approximately 80 stores in North America during the second quarter and we are close to finalizing plan to close approximately 40 additional retail stores during the back half of 2014 and to streamline our supply chain in North America') and the continued growth of Staples.com did not fully offset. Note the margin line too: the pressure of the online comparators...and cannibalisation. On the latter have a look at this excerpt from the conference call: 'we generated over 400,000 customer orders and grow over 30% growth on our in-store Staples.com kiosk, which is now approaching 5% of our total U.S. retail sales mix'
The commercial business was better in the sense that sales went up but margins did compress and hence there was an operating income fall. As the company noted on the conference call:
'Growth remained strong in facilities and breakroom, and
we're building momentum in furniture and promotional products. This was
partially offset by sales declines in ink and toner, paper and core office
supplies'.
Meanwhile the international operations remained loss-making including an (almost) unbelievable statistic that European online activities saw a sales decline.
Otherwise free cash flow appeared at initial glance very reasonable for a discrete quarter for a company with an EV of just over US$9bn. They have even been buying stock back at an average price of US$12.2.
And the US$600m guided full year free cash flow is equivalent to a c. 8% free cash flow yield - more than enough to cover the 3.5%+ dividend yield.
Sum-of-the-parts thoughts? Core North American stores FY US$400m of ebit at a depressed x6 multiple gives US$2.4bn. The better Commercial operations of FY c. US$550m of ebit at a x10 multiple makes US$5.5bn. Meanwhile the International operations I value at just x0.1 of sales i.e. c. US$400m. It still makes sense to me for someone (anyone) to take it off their hands...
Add all that together and that gives US$8.3bn. The EV is about US$1bn more than this but with free cash flow of US$600m (around half available ex the dividend) this gap can close further.
The real hidden value of Staples though lays in simplification (getting rid of international?) and domestic store closure which places greater emphasis on the dot com operation where there is real potential. As the company noted in the conference call:
'I mean when you think about the market share of Staples or
even Staples plus Office Depot, it’s a pretty small share of a pretty big
market. So it could go to contract, it could go online somewhere, it could go
to mass merchants, Walmart, Target, Kmart...'
You have to wait for a discount on that conservative sum-of-the-parts to buy more Staples shares (US$10?) but if you own some I don't think it makes much sense to kick them out now. In the US$13s maybe start losing a few.
As I noted the last time I wrote about the company:
'Staples is wounded but not broken...even though investors should expect the company to continue shutting shops over time. Inherently they are well-advanced in their own online activities, have seen their number 2 and 3 competitors merge (good for margins) and retain strong brand recognition...The company retains optionality...but has to prove that it has stabilised, especially on the store front, in North America whilst the International assets have to move into profit...or be exited/sold. Given the cashflows, I would not be surprised if private equity will circle too'.







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